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KENNETH MICHAEL WHITE
ABSTRACT: According to the text of the United States Constitution, the
power to declare and fund war is vested in Congress, while the power
to execute the war is vested in the President. Thus, in order to prosecute an offensive war the President must first get permission from
Congress. What mechanism keeps the President from dishonestly
making the case for war in order to get congressional war powers? The
presidential oath. Comparing the beginning of the Vietnam War in
1964 with the beginning of the Iraq War in 2002–2003 from a common perspective reveals how both President Johnson and President
Bush knowingly used suspect information to lobby Congress during
a congressional election cycle in order to gain congressional war powers. If war powers are not gained “faithfully,” i.e., honestly and in good
faith as required by the oath of office, then any congressional authority gained by the executive is unconstitutional and therefore illegal.
Presidents cannot profit from a wrong.

INTRODUCTION
ON FEBRUARY 16, 2001, while George W. Bush, President of the United
States (U.S.), attended a news conference in Mexico hosted by Vicente
Fox, President of Mexico, a distinct difference between the two men
became apparent when reporters asked questions about Iraq.1 President
Fox hesitated to make a declaration regarding Iraq saying: “this is not
the meeting in which decisions or details are going to be reached,
because they do not belong in the power of—the executive power, as

KENNETH MICHAEL WHITE is assistant professor of Political Science and Criminal
Justice at Kennesaw State University.
1
Bush, George. W. February 16, 2001. News Conference with President Vicente
Fox of Mexico in San Cristobal, Mexico.
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such, because they have to have the participation of other groups.”2
When another reporter asked about the then recent bombing of Iraq by
U.S. military forces in the “no-fly zone,” President Fox repeated his deference to comity: “I do not have a position or a statement on that topic,
specifically because this will be done through the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs in the future.”3
Contrarily, President Bush showed no hesitation at the news conference to refer to executive prerogative regarding Iraq. Bush said:
In answer to part B of your question, the United States is engaged in
the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. We will remain so. A routine
mission was conducted to enforce the no-fly zone, and it is a mission
about which I was informed and I authorized. But I repeat, it is a routine mission, and we will continue to enforce the no-fly zone until the
world is told otherwise.4

The clear impression here is that President Bush has the authority to
authorize the use of military force in the no-fly zone in Iraq, and he will
continue to make similar decisions until “the world is told otherwise.”
Presumably, Bush alone will do the telling. This unilateral view of foreign affairs that disregards input from legislative and international
sources is a dramatically different view of foreign affairs than the one
the Framers of the U.S. Constitution envisioned.
On July 12, 2001, President Bush declared “Captive Nations Week”
to mark the successful transition to democracy by many world nations,
and to raise awareness about countries like “Afghanistan, Burma, Cuba,
Iraq, and Sudan” that deny freedom to their people.5 This proclamation
was repeated one year later on July 17, 2002.6 On October 16, 2002,
after political pressure from the Bush Administration regarding the
threat posed by Iraq, Congress authorized President Bush to use military force in Iraq “as he deems necessary and appropriate” to enforce
United Nations resolutions.7 The sole authority of when to go to war
with Iraq had thus been delegated by Congress to President Bush.
On October 23, 2002, President Bush took this authority and continued to rally support for an invasion of Iraq by declaring “United
2

Ibid.
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
5
Bush, George W. July 12, 2001. Proclamation 7455 Captive Nations Week, 2001.
6
Bush, George W. July 17, 2002. Proclamation 7577 Captive Nations Week, 2002.
7
U.S. Cong. October 16, 2002. 107 P.L. 243. Authorization for Use of Military
Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002. §3(a).
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Nations Day, 2002.”8 Though the United Nations is a world body that
includes 191 member states, Bush only mentioned by name one foreign
country: Iraq was presented as a “particular” threat to the “civilized
world.”9 Bush continued to present Iraq as a threat in subsequent
proclamations. On December 9, 2002, Bush proclaimed “Human Rights
Day, Bill of Rights Day, and Human Rights Week, 2002.”10 In a statement
that foreshadowed the invasion, Bush said, “And I hope the people of
Iraq will soon realize their own dreams of peace and freedom.”11 Bush’s
next executive order on the subject came after the invasion of Iraq,
which took place in March 2003.12 Why Bush chose March 2003 to
actually invade Iraq is less interesting than why he sought the authority
to invade Iraq during the 2002 congressional elections and why he used
discredited intelligence to argue Iraq posed an imminent threat. Did
Bush act in good faith when presenting Iraq as an imminent threat during the congressional elections of 2002?
The answer to this question about Bush and the similar one that
follows about Johnson is approached from the common perspective.
This methodology assumes that reasoning bolstered by relevant empirical evidence is enough to sustain a political argument about America,
even though reasonable minds can disagree and argue differently. This
ancient way of discussing politics is admittedly different—nay, completely opposite—than the usual way of modern social science. Where
modern social science demands an appeal to previously acceptable
appeals, the methodology employed here makes no such demands,
except in the sense that the only historical or relative appeal that matters where it counts is the appeal to The Declaration of Independence.
This is the kind of paper that might have been written “[a]bout a generation ago, [when] an American diplomat could still say that ‘the natural
and the divine foundation of the rights of man . . . is self-evident to all
Americans.’”13 In other words, this paper carries the weight of not exact
science but of inexact opinion—the eternal thing an ordinary, reasonable,
and prudent individual uses to decide the most important matters on
Earth: life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

8

Bush, George W. October 23, 2002. Proclamation 7614 United Nations Day, 2002.
Ibid.
10
Bush, George W. December 9, 2002. Proclamation 7634 Human Rights Day, Bill
of Rights Day, and Human Rights Week.
11
Ibid.
12
Bush, George W. March 20, 2003. Executive Order 13290 Confiscating and
Vesting Certain Iraqi Property.
13
Strauss, Leo. 1965. Natural Right and History. University of Chicago Press at 1.
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Before the question of these rights and President Bush and Iraq in
2002–2003, there was the same question regarding President Lyndon B.
Johnson and Vietnam in 1964. On August 2, 1964, in the Gulf of
Tonkin, just off the north coast of Vietnam, communist commandos
attacked the U.S. destroyer Maddox.14 President Johnson responded the
next day by increasing the U.S. presence in the area and instructing the
Navy to attack and destroy any subsequent aggressive force it meets.15
On August 4, 1964, President Johnson announced that U.S. ships in the
Gulf of Tonkin area [the Maddox and the Turner Joy] were attacked, and
because of these “renewed hostile actions” he ordered a bombing raid
on certain North Vietnamese targets that were suspected of being
responsible.16 President Johnson subsequently sought and received
authorization from Congress on August 7, 1964 to “take all necessary
measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the U.S. and to
prevent further aggression.”17
The Pentagon Papers, an internal military report (released to the
public by The New York Times and U.S. Senator Mike Gravel), details the
history of the Defense Department’s decision-making in Vietnam and
suggest that the first attack on the Maddox was not unprovoked and the
second attack on both the Maddox and the Turner Joy may not have
occurred. Regarding the first attack on August 2nd, the North
Vietnamese “admitted retaliation for an attack by South Vietnamese
boats on two North Vietnamese islands.”18 The retaliation was apparently a response to covert U.S. offensive programs in North Vietnam
respectively called “OPLAN 34A” and the “provocative” DESOTO
patrols, which “the Maddox and the Turner Joy had been doing when
attacked.”19 The second alleged attack on August 4th is suspected of
being nothing more than bad weather and nerves on the part of U.S.
sailors (“shooting at flying fish”).20
Congress later rescinded the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in January
of 1971.21 Part of the reason for this action was that the official start of
14

Johnson, Lyndon B. August 4, 1964. Remarks to the Nation about Attacks in
the Gulf of Tonkin.
15
Johnson, Lyndon B. August 3, 1964. Instruction to the Navy following Gulf
of Tonkin attack.
16
Johnson. August 4.
17
U.S. Congress. August 7, 1964. H.J. RES 1145.
18
The Pentagon Papers. 1971. at 329.
19
Ibid.
20
See note 79 infra.
21
U.S. Cong. January 12, 1971. HR15628. Termination of Southeast Asia
Resolution.
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the Vietnam War proffered by the Johnson administration left something to be desired. I posit that that something is truth. Section A of this
article will argue that the Framers conceived of an honest federal government, especially with regard to foreign relations. Section B will argue
that the presidential oath creates a positive duty to be honest with foreign nations. Section C will argue that President Johnson violated his
oath in 1964 when advocating for the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.
Section D will contrast Johnson’s leadership in the Vietnam War
with Bush’s leadership in the Iraq War. Before Iraq was invaded in
March of 2003, President George W. Bush said in January, in his State
of the Union Address, that Saddam Hussein had then recently sought
materials to create a nuclear bomb.22 Bush said, “The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant
quantities of uranium from Africa.”23 This claim garnered much controversy “since most government experts familiar with the statement
believed it to be unsupportable.”24 After the invasion of Iraq, the White
House retracted the statement, and the media reported that Bush
blamed the bad intelligence on the Central Intelligence Administration,
reporting that Bush said: “it was the CIA’s fault.”25 Bush’s attempt to
avoid responsibility for a scandal by blaming a department raises more
than just the wisdom of the decision of the Framer’s to establish a unitary executive, it also raises the issue of the constitutional oath and
requirement of good faith and suggests a parallel between President
Johnson in 1964 and President Bush in 2002–2003.26
Section E will address the effect of the oath to “faithfully” execute
the office of president. Assuming arguendo the presidential oath was
violated when advocating for a congressional delegation of war powers,
what then is the effect of such a breach? Was the delegation unconstitutional as soon as Congress delivered it; when the breach became
known by preponderance of evidence; or not at all? I argue here that the
delegation is unconstitutional the moment of the breach. The fatal flaw
is in the failure to follow the constitutional process—in this case, the
22

Bush, George W. January 28, 2003. The State of the Union Address.
Ibid.
24
Duffy, Michael, and James Carney. July 21, 2003. “A Question of Trust: The
CIA’s Tenet takes the fall for a flawed claim in the State of the Union, but has
Bush’s credibility taken an even greater hit?” Time.
25
Isikoff, Michael, and Tamara Lipper. July 21, 2003. “A Spy Takes the Bullet:
The Bushies blamed CIA director George Tenet for the faulty-Iraq-intel
firestorm. Now his career is on the line.” Newsweek.
26
See Jeffrey K. Tulis. 1987. The Rhetorical Presidency. Princeton Press at 18.
23
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oath—because regardless of which branch a misfeasance or a malfeasance comes from, the result is the same: an unconstitutional act produces unconstitutional fruit.27 Only when a result follows a constitutional process can that result be properly considered constitutional.28
As the common law maxim goes, one may not profit from a wrong.29
Section F of this article will conclude that Bush, like Johnson in
1964, violated his oath to “faithfully execute” the office of President of
the U.S. by hyping the threat posed by an enemy to gain the congressional authority to take the country to war. Accordingly, comparisons
between the Vietnam War and the Iraq Invasion are not unwarranted or
without basis. There is good reason to compare the two affairs, especially in the context of analyzing executive honesty. The importance of
comparing the events is the maxim: those who fail to study history are
doomed to repeat it.

SECTION A: THE FRAMERS

AND

EXECUTIVE HONESTY

The Declaration of Independence is not a document unconscious of
truth.30 Thomas Jefferson appealed expressly to a “candid world” to
judge whether the King of Great Britain committed serious enough
offenses to warrant revolution. Jefferson said that it was merely a
“decent respect to the opinions of mankind” that required the Framers
to “declare the causes” of “the separation.”31 In addition to a declaration
of the “self-evident” nature of “truths” like natural rights, The
Declaration of Independence also stands for the principle that the U.S.
should approach foreign policy honestly. Jefferson also said that when
the “political bands” that connected early Americans to Great Britain
were thrown off, what remained was a “separate and equal station to
which the laws of nature and of nature’s God entitle them.”32 Once
America revolted against England, America became an independent
nation living in a state of nature with England and other nations.
John Locke, America’s philosopher, also described a similar situation in his Second Treatise of Government.33 Locke spoke of a power of
27

See Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
29
For more on the common law maxim that “no man shall profit by his own
wrong” see Bradley v. Fox, 129 N.E.2d 699 (1955).
30
Jefferson, Thomas. 1776. The Declaration of Independence.
31
Ibid.
32
Ibid.
33
Locke, John. [1689] 1988. Two Treatises of Government.
28
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government called “natural” or “federative.”34 This power contains
those governmental authorities that today are called foreign affairs, e.g.,
“power of war,” “peace,” “leagues and alliances,” and “all the transactions with all persons and communities without [or not part of] the
commonwealth.”35 Locke said that this federative or natural power is
usually held by one branch of government, though he explained that
they are actually held concurrently as legislative and executive authority before a government vests them officially in any branch or branches.
Key here is Locke’s point that when it comes to foreign relations with
other governments, the people are one nation:
For though in a commonwealth the members of it are distinct persons
still in reference to one another, and as such are governed by the laws
of society; yet in reference to the rest of mankind, they make one body,
which is, as every member of it before was, still in the state of nature
with the rest of mankind.36

According to Locke, the state of nature too often falls into a state of
all out war because people in the state of nature do not consult reason
enough to solve their disputes.37 This poses a problem for the hypothesis that truth should matter in foreign affairs. If Locke is correct to
argue that nations are in a state of nature with other nations, and if it is
true that the state of nature is almost always a state of war (where there
is no truth, if truth is the first casualty of war), then is there any ground
that would require an executive to be truthful towards other nations?
The first President, George Washington, shows that such ground exists.
George Washington set the precedent for executive honesty.38 In his
Inaugural Address, he spoke of an established “truth,” “an indissoluble
union between virtue and happiness.”39 In his Farewell Address
Washington expanded on his understanding of executive honesty.40
After explaining that America’s future happiness lie in its federal system
of government invigorated with the principles of comity and moral
virtue, Washington recommended the U.S. “[o]bserve good faith and
justice towards all nations.”41 His words:
34

Ibid. at 411.

35

Ibid.

36

Locke at 411.

37

Ibid.

38

Washington, George. 1789. First Inaugural Address.

39

Ibid. at 53.

40

Washington, George. 1796. Farewell Address.

41

Ibid. at 221.
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The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in
extending our commercial relations to have with them as little political connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop.42

Washington thus concluded his presidency with the same appeal for
honesty in foreign affairs that Jefferson made when writing The
Declaration of Independence. Washington offered himself “to the
world” though the “discharge of [his] official duties” as an example of
his faith in the correctness of a principled government.43 Washington
claimed for himself and for the country: “honesty is always the best policy.”44
According to Herbert J. Storing, George Washington was a “model
of what a republican executive ought to be.”45 Part of this model is
Washington’s moral virtue and commitment to honesty. During the
constitutional convention Benjamin Franklin suggested the country
would always have “a sufficient number of wise and good men to undertake and execute well and faithfully the Office.”46 Although Franklin was
in principle suggesting that a president not be paid a salary, his motion
was accepted, suggesting the delegates agreed with Franklin about the
end (a faithful executive) and only disagreed with him as to the means
of achieving that end (it was ultimately determined by the delegates that
a president would be paid a salary).
Franklin epitomized Washington or visa versa to the extent both
believed the pursuit of happiness is a pursuit of moral virtue, but
Franklin counseled nevertheless there would always be a number of
people “who have need of honest instruments for the management of
their affairs.”47 Washington and Franklin are not the only Framers to
presume “honest instruments” like the Constitution. Thomas Jefferson
also echoed this principle in his First Inaugural Address.48 Eluding to the
Lockean notion of the state of nature between nations, Jefferson called
for “guidance and support” to lead the country prudently “in a troubled

42

Ibid. at 222.
Ibid. at 223.
44
Ibid.
45
Storing, Herbert J. 1969. Introduction. In Charles Thach, Creation of the
Presidency.
46
Madison, James. June 2, 1787. Records of the Federal Convention. (italics added).
47
Franklin, Benjamin. 1996. The Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin. Dover
Thrift Edition at 71.
48
Jefferson, Thomas. 1801. First Inaugural Address.
43
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world.”49 When listing expressly just what the U.S. government can and
should do, Jefferson made “honest friendship with all nations” a priority.50
Though not a Framer, Lincoln is also a model of a republican executive like Washington and Jefferson. The Framers counseled fairness
and candor to would-be external enemies whereas Lincoln did the same
to would-be internal enemies. In the first sentence of his First Inaugural
Address, Lincoln referenced the presidential oath.51 He went on to tell
the South: “I take the official oath today, with no mental reservations,
and with no purpose to construe the Constitution or laws, by any
hypercritical rules.”52 Lincoln claimed the oath to “faithfully execute the
office” imposes the “simple duty” to “constitutionally defend and maintain [the nation] . . . [and] in doing this there needs to be no bloodshed
or violence . . . unless it be forced upon the national authority.”53Lincoln
thus saw a distinction between his personal moral view on slavery and
the legal view imposed by the law and the oath, such that the oath for
Lincoln required fairness; non-aggression; and a faithful execution of
the laws that is non-cognizant of private preferences.54
That the Framers of the Constitution recognized the need for honest statesmen was apparent to Lincoln and also to the dissenters of the
constitutional convention, the Anti-Federalists. Patrick Henry found the
Constitution to be “horribly frightful” because as he said:
It is on a supposition that your American governors shall be honest,
that all the good qualities of this government are founded; but its
defective and imperfect construction puts it in their power to perpetrate the worst of mischiefs, should they be bad men; and, sir, would
not all the world, from the eastern to the western hemisphere, blame
our distracted folly in resting our rights upon the contingency of our
rulers being good men, without a consequent loss of liberty!55

Note Henry’s concern for world opinion, suggesting a consensus
on this matter at the time. Henry’s main point of course was that the
Constitution was impractical because it requires a person like
49

Ibid. at 322.
Ibid. at 323.
51
Lincoln, Abraham. March 4, 1861. First Inaugural Address.
52
Ibid. (italics added).
53
Lincoln, Abraham. April 4, 1864. Letter to Albert G. Hodges.
54
Lincoln said he only imposed his views on the South after it had started
aggressions and even then only when an “indispensable necessity had come.”
(See Ibid.).
55
Henry, Patrick. June 5, 1788. Speech Against Ratification.
50
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Washington or Lincoln to work properly. Without that moral virtue,
that commitment to honesty, then the President of the U.S. turns from
a peaceful executive with enumerated authority into, in the words of
George Clinton, “the generalissimo of the nation.”56
How did the Constitution address the charge of the Anti-Federalists
and ensure that at least the Chief Executive of the nation would act in
good faith? The answer is the oath of office.

SECTION B: THE CONSTITUTION

AND

EXECUTIVE HONESTY

The Constitution is best viewed as a contract. It is a social contract, representing a free people’s placement of their natural authority into the
hands of a federal and limited, republican government for the purpose
of securing for the future a government of efficiency, justice, peace,
defense, general welfare, and liberty.57 By its terms, the Constitution
establishes contractual requirements to serve in office. In legislative
departments, citizens of seven years who are older than 25 may serve in
the House of Representatives for the State in which he/she lives if
elected.58 Senators need be 30 years old and citizens for at least nine
years and living in the State they represent and inhabit.59 The President,
however, has the strictest requirements for office that includes age and
citizenship standards (35 years old and natural born citizen), but also
an oath:
I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office
of President of the United States, and will to the best of my ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.60

The key word is “faithfully.” The President of the U.S., in order to
be President, must exercise the office—that is, all of the powers and
duties—in good faith.61 As Lincoln said, “I could not take office without
taking the oath.”62 The Constitution requires good faith, and if it is not
delivered then the Constitution has been violated. Important for the
56
Clinton, George. November 8, 1787. “Fourth Essay of ‘Cato’.” The New York
Journal.
57
Preamble, U.S. Const.
58
U.S. Const., Art. I., §2.2.
59
U.S. Const., Art. I., §3.3.
60
U.S. Const., Art. II., §5 and §8.
61
For a discussion of the powers and duties of the executive, see Joseph M.
Bessette and Gary J. Schmitt. 1998. “What Does ‘High Crimes and
Misdemeanors’ Mean?”
62
Lincoln. April 4.
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purpose of this article, is the meaning of good faith in a negotiation, for
the lawmaking process is a kind of negotiation between the executive
and the legislative branches, and the executive is a kind of lawyer—like,
most of all, a prosecutor—fairly subject to the profession’s ethical obligations.63 But even if one concedes that the President has a duty to
lobby Congress in good faith, what exactly does that mean?
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts prescribes for all contracts a
duty of good faith and fair dealing: “Every contract imposes upon each
party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and
enforcement.”64 Note that the rule distinguishes between performance
and enforcement. In a sense, this is understood to mean that the duty
to perform a contract in good faith once established is distinct from the
duty to fairly negotiate a contract not yet formed—the performance obligation is a higher, more stringent standard than the negotiation requirement.65 Thus, it is generally thought that the ethical obligation during
negotiation requires less adherence to veracity compared to the duty to
be honest once a contract has been formed.
In the context of the President of the U.S., this distinction of good
faith between the negotiation and performance context is moot. The
constitutional requirement of executive good faith is by nature of the
office. According to the Constitution an executive cannot exercise executive authority except in good faith; therefore, the act of “negotiating”
with Congress to turn a bill into law is not a distinction with any difference when it comes to the duty of good faith. As Lincoln argued, anything an executive decides to do must be done honestly.66
To address the criticism, however, even in practice the distinction
between the duty to negotiate the terms of a contract fairly and the duty
to exercise good faith once a contact has formed does not destroy the
obligation to be honest. According to the Model Rules that govern
lawyers’ professional responsibility, rule 4.1 and its comments prohibit
an attorney from making a “false” statement of a “material” fact during
a negotiation.67 This distinction is called the puffing rule. It is okay to
“puff” about unimportant details, but it is not okay to lie about the
important ones. Some may argue that what is “important” or “material”
is, like beauty: only in the eye of the beholder and, thus, the distinction
63

See Scalia’s dissent in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (Scalia compares
a president to a prosecutor, which, if a true analogy, makes holding the president to the ethical standard of attorneys reasonable).
64
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, §205.
65
See Texaco v. Pennzoil, 729 S.W.2d 768 (1987).
66
Lincoln. April 4.
67
American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 4.1.
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will inevitably give rise to endless conflicting opinions on what assertions by an executive require the strict scrutiny test for truth. I doubt
the Framers would accept this position.
The Framers—who, themselves, relied on the common perspective—
were certainly aware that reasonable people could disagree on things if
given the liberty to form their own opinions.68 But the Framers did not
disagree as to the most important things themselves. For example, as
shown above both Franklin and Washington were in complete agreement that happiness is moral virtue, not simply whatever a beholder
claims it to be. Also, The Declaration of Independence identifies “self-evident” truths, which is impossible from a non-common perspective.
Furthermore, the Framers would not have signed The Declaration of
Independence if they could not agree on the most important things—after
all, those signatories who signed that document did so under the
penalty of death. The Framers were not historicists or relativists. With
this disposition in mind, what is material is discernable from the common perspective. If going to war is material, then what remains is the
question of Johnson and Bush’s honesty regarding their respective presidential campaigns for war.

SECTION C: PRESIDENT JOHNSON

AND

EXECUTIVE HONESTY

Before Lyndon B. Johnson took office after being sworn in upon John
F. Kennedy’s assassination, Dwight D. Eisenhower occupied the office
of the President. When Eisenhower gave his farewell address he spoke
of an association with Congress consistent with comity.69 He said: “Our
people expect their President and the Congress to find essential agreement on issues of great moment.”70 Like Washington, Eisenhower
offered himself as an exemplar of principle. Eisenhower said: “In this
final relationship, the Congress and the Administration have, on most
vital issues, cooperated well, to serve the national good rather than
mere partisanship.”71 Eisenhower placed a premium on working with
68

See Madison, James. 1787. “Essay 10.” The Federalist Papers.
Eisenhower, Dwight D. January 17, 1961. Farewell Address.
70
Ibid.
71
Ibid. (Eisenhower warned that the country faced a new “crisis”: “This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new
in the American experience. The total influence—economic, political, even spiritual—is felt in every city, every State house, every office of the Federal government.” The influence of this “military-industrial complex,” whether “sought or
unsought,” exists and will “persist” into the future. The possible influence the
military establishment had on Johnson’s decision to seek a “blank check” for
the Vietnam War is not addressed here, although it is worth noting that The
69
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Congress, not against it, on important matters, and the question is
whether Johnson followed his example.72
Johnson first spoke to the nation about the Gulf of Tonkin on
August 3, 1964.73 The announcement took less than 100 words, the
substance of the statement was that the U.S. military would continue to
patrol the north coast of Vietnam and would destroy any force that
attacked it.74 Left out of this short speech were some material facts: (1)
the U.S. had given aid to South Vietnamese commandos who previously
attacked “two North Vietnamese islands,” and (2) the patrols were considered “provocative” even by U.S. military standards.75 The failure to
present these facts means the public did not have the information
required to conclude that the was at least an equal aggressor in
Vietnam at the time.
If Johnson cared that his August 3rd statement left out material
facts, he did not make up for it by giving the American people the full
account of what was known about the Gulf of Tonkin affair the next day.
On August 4, 1964, Johnson spoke to the nation again, this time on
national television. In his first sentence, Johnson invoked his “duty” as
“President and Commander in Chief” to tell the public about “renewed
hostile actions against U.S. ships on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin”
that required Johnson “to order the military forces of the United States
to take action in reply.”76
Whether Johnson thought the second attack happened is debated,
with some suggesting that at the time Johnson thought the attack
occurred. Assuming arguendo this is so, what to make of the statement
that “today,” on August 4th, Johnson “ordered” the military to “take
action in reply”? Johnson ordered military action on August 3rd, as
shown above, not August 4th. On August 4th, the commanders of the
ships in the Gulf of Tonkin understood that they were authorized to
destroy any attackers because of the August 3rd order. Johnson appears
to be confusing the August 2nd attack with the August 4th incident.
Johnson went on to say:
Pentagon Papers acknowledge that the Kennedy administration was pursuing a
policy of withdrawal prior to his assassination and the Johnson administration
reversed this policy shortly after taking office in the summer of 1964. See The
Pentagon Papers at 458).
72
It is also a question whether Bush followed Eisenhower’s admonishment to
vindicate comity.
73
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The initial attack on the destroyer Maddox, on August 2, was repeated
today by a number of hostile vessels attacking two U.S. destroyers
with torpedoes. The destroyers and supporting aircraft acted at once
on the orders I gave after the initial act of aggression. We believe at
least two of the attacking boats were sunk. There were no U.S.
losses.77

Explicating this statement leads to the following. Johnson says an
attack occurred on August 2nd. He says an attack also occurred on
August 4th in the same sentence. In the next sentence he says he gave
orders to respond “after the initial act of aggression.” Johnson says that
the initial act of aggression occurred on August 2nd, but in his language
it is unclear whether he is referring to the August 2nd attack or the
August 4th attack when he says: “two of the attacking boats were sunk.”
It is unclear when than sinking occurred. In reality, U.S. ships damaged
three North Vietnamese boats on August 2nd (one sank), but no boats
were damaged on August 4th. This reality is not clear from Johnson’s
speech, though it was known at the time.
Johnson’s obfuscation of the facts on a matter of starting a war is a
breach of the oath to “faithfully” execute the office.78 Scholarship shows
that there is no question Johnson played fast and loose with the facts to
sell the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.79 Critics might suggest that though
Johnson could have been clearer there is no material breach. In my
opinion, the material/non-material distinction does not matter for
determining whether Johnson violated his oath, as explained above, but
to address the criticism consider the following.
After framing the debate in the minds of soon-to-be voters by going
over the collective head of Congress on August 4th, President Johnson
addressed Congress directly on August 5, 1964.80 Again referring to
“further deliberate attacks” on U.S. interests, Johnson requested from
Congress “a resolution expressing the unity and determination of the
77
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United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in southeast Asia.”81 Johnson said, “America keeps her word,” invoking the principle of honesty to suggest that the country was duty bound to authorize him to exercise complete military authority in Vietnam because of a
prior treaty.82
Johnson did not explain, however, how the U.S.’s treaty obligations
in Vietnam included compliance in coups and other clandestine military operations.83 This is, perhaps, not hard to understand if one considers the rhetorical fantasy Johnson was creating at the time, going so
far as to claim: “We have no military, political, or territorial ambitions in
the area.”84 This appears almost ridiculous today, in the sense that everything the U.S. government did/does in Vietnam or elsewhere is “political” by definition.
Johnson framed the debate to eliminate discourse, yet ironically he
promised a “free” congressional deliberation.85 He said:
I have been given encouraging assurance by these leaders of both parties that such a resolution will be promptly introduced, freely and
expeditiously debated, and passed with overwhelming support. And
just a few minutes ago I was able to reach Senator Goldwater and I am
glad to say that he has expressed his support of the statement that I
am making to you tonight.86

Johnson cannot be sincere, however, because the obvious effect of
bringing the resolution to Congress during an election cycle was that it
pressured members to disregard their duty to deliberate. The full energy
of the office (the bully-pulpit) was brought to bear on Congress, and
there is no doubt Johnson approved of bringing the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution to Congress during the most sensitive political moment in
politics, i.e., a political campaign. The day after he promised free deliberations, Johnson explained why he saw positive signs of endorsement
on August 4th, even though no deliberation had yet taken place.
Johnson said:
The events of this week would in any event have made the passage of
a Congressional Resolution essential. But there is an additional reason
for doing so at a time when we are entering on three months of political campaigning. Hostile nations must understand that in such a
81

Ibid.
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (Manila Pact). September 8, 1954.
83
See The Pentagon Papers.
84
Johnson. August 5. (italics added).
85
Johnson. August 4.
86
Ibid.
82

324 — JOURNAL

OF

LIBERTARIAN STUDIES 22 (2010)

period the United States will continue to protect its national interests,
and that in these matters there is no division among us.87

Johnson implies that patriots would vote for this bill while traitors
would not, which is hardly rhetoric conducive to open and honest
deliberation. To his credit, Johnson claimed to appreciate the gravity of
his request, describing it as a “solemn responsibility” and the result of
his “considered conviction.”88 The problem, however, is that Johnson
claimed that the attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin were “unprovoked.”89
This is the material breach of Johnson’s oath, for it suggests the U.S. is
clearly in the moral position in the Vietnam War—as a defender, not an
aggressor—and that was not true. The Pentagon Papers reveal Johnson’s
position as false when he delivered it, as the U.S. ships that were
“attacked” were expressly conducting what were considered to be
“provocative” patrols even by U.S. standards.90
White House attorneys argued in a memorandum created for
Johnson in June 1964 that the President of the U.S. had the unilateral
authority to send military forces to Vietnam.91 The memorandum suggests that the bases for Johnson to act unilaterally and send forces to
Vietnam are (1) an act of Congress (Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and
subsequent amendments) and (2) the Constitution. The commanderin-chief clause is cited as giving Johnson the authority to send troops to
Vietnam (before the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution). Tellingly, the oath of
office is absent from the legal analysis, suggesting it was not on the
minds of the White House counsel to ensure the exercise of the commander-in-chief authority, whatever that may be, is done “faithfully” and
consistent with the example set by the Framers. They missed part of the
controlling law, in my opinion, by not accounting for the good faith
requirement of the presidential oath.
Johnson’s failure to appreciate his oath of office may have led in
part to Congress’ later decision to rescind the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
in 1971.92 Consider the Congressional Record for the Senate on March 23,
1970:

87

Johnson. August 5.
Ibid.
89
Johnson. August 5.
90
The Pentagon Papers at 329.
91
Rusk, Dean. June 29, 1964. Memorandum for the President. Declassified on
December 29, 1977.
92
HR15628.
88

HOW

THE

PEACE

WAS

LOST — 325

The Tonkin Resolution on Vietnam was a fraud, and while that
became clearer later, it might have been clearer at the time if the right
questions had been pressed, if Congress had not closed its eyes out of
misplaced deference to the President and waved him down a wrong
road.93

Norman Solomon, a writer and syndicated columnist, described
the “free” debate over the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution as “an invitation to
stand up and salute the flag, and anybody who refused to do so was
attacked as a, was essentially treated as, a pariah, attacked as somebody
who lacked requisite patriotism and military resolve.”94 Senator Wayne
Morse, one of only two dissenters in the entire Congress to the Gulf of
Tonkin Resolution, said during an interview, “I am pleading that the
American people be given the facts about our foreign policy.”95 To which
Peter Lisagor replied, “You know the American people cannot formulate
and execute foreign policy.”96 Senator Morse decried this position: “the
American people [can] follow the facts if you’ll give them . . . we’re not
giving the American people the facts.”97
History proves Morse right: Johnson was not telling the American
people the truth. This failure was a violation of the presidential oath and
it made the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution unconstitutional. Though
Congress later appropriated funds to support the troops in Vietnam
after it became known that Johnson misled the country, this in no way
saves the constitutionality of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. While a
Senator, Lincoln voted against the Mexican War, yet he voted for supplying the troops.98 He said, “That vote affirms that the war was unnecessarily and unconstitutionally commenced by the President . . . [it] has
nothing to do in determining my votes on the question of supplies.”99
According to Lincoln, an executive can unconstitutionally force the
nation into war and later coerce Congress to support the bad decision
because of the need to protect deployed soldiers. Such support should
not be construed, however, to make constitutional the unconstitutional
request for war.
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The Pentagon Papers show the August 4th attack in the Gulf of
Tonkin was disputed and, most importantly, that the attack was not
unprovoked. Johnson thus violated his oath when he called for war
before it was “forced upon the national authority.”100 Whether an executive can bully Congress during an election cycle with bad information
to gain unfettered military power is a question that seems to answer
itself. The question is of course very relevant today, as the U.S. military
fights in Iraq pursuant to a law based on now unsupportable claims of
weapons of mass destruction. To gain the authority to invade Iraq, the
Bush Administration used discredited intelligence to advocate that Iraq
was an imminent threat and pressured Congress during an election
cycle to authorize President Bush to have sole discretion of when to use
force against Iraq, which presents a striking parallel between the Gulf of
Tonkin and the current Iraq war.

SECTION D: PRESIDENT BUSH

AND

EXECUTIVE HONESTY

President Bush’s claim in his 2003 State of the Union Address about the
nuclear ambitions of Saddam Hussein and Iraq, which were part of a
systematic campaign to present Iraq as an imminent threat to the country, eventually led to the indictment of I. Lewis Libby, a.k.a., “Scooter
Libby,” former Assistant to the President of the U.S., Chief of Staff to the
Vice President of the U.S., and Assistant to the Vice President for
National Security Affairs. At the time of this writing, Libby resigned his
position in the White House to defend himself against charges of
obstruction of justice, making false statements to government officials,
and perjury.101 Whether Libby will be found guilty and/or whether
other parties in the White House or elsewhere will or should also face
indictment or impeachment is not the focus here. Libby’s indictment
does, however, relate to President Bush’s duty to act in good faith, especially when arguing the nation should go to war, and it is informative.
The indictment lists the facts of the case as follows. First, President
Bush said in his State of the Union Address on January 28, 2003, “The
British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought
significant quantities of uranium from Africa.”102 Second, the New York
Times published an article casting serious doubt on the veracity of
Bush’s claim.103 Third, Libby asked for information about the source for
100
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the article, which turned out to be Joseph Wilson a “former career State
Department official who had held a variety of posts, including United
States Ambassador.”104
Fourth, there was top-level discussion about Wilson in the Office of
the Vice President.105 Fifth, Libby learned in early June that Wilson’s
wife worked at the CIA and was involved in sending her husband on a
fact-finding trip about Bush’s State of the Union statement.106 Sixth,
when more media stories about Bush’s inaccurate statement were published Libby began to express “displeasure that CIA officials were making comments to reporters critical of the Vice President’s office.”107
Libby then spoke with a reporter and criticized the CIA for “selective
leaking” and disclosed the identity of Wilson’s wife.108
Seventh, Wilson wrote an Op-Ed article and granted interviews
with the media in which he was critical of Bush’s claim in the State of
the Union and suggested that the Bush Administration understood the
words were false when delivered.109 Eighth, after Wilson’s Op-Ed article
and media appearances the Bush Administration began collecting more
information about Wilson and his wife, and met with reporters who
then published the identity of Wilson’s wife as part of an effort to
respond to Wilson’s allegation that Bush lied during his State of the
Union Address.110 Because Wilson’s wife was a “classified” employee of
the CIA an investigation into the leak of her name was begun on or
about September 26, 2003, which eventually led to the indictment of
Libby in October of 2005.111
Wilson was not the only critic of the Bush Administration’s presentation of the threat posed by Iraq. After the invasion of Iraq had
occurred, the Senate conducted an investigation of the prewar intelligence since it had become virtually certain that the threat posed by
Saddam Hussein and Iraq were overstated by Bush and others.112
Regarding the claim that Iraq had stockpiles of weapons of mass
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destruction, the investigator in charge of looking for them flatly stated:
“I don’t think they existed.”113 The Senate agreed, and in its report on
prewar intelligence concluded: “The assessment that Iraq ‘is reconstituting its nuclear program’ was not supported by the intelligence provided
to the Committee.”114
The Special Counsel, Patrick J. Fitzgerald, was assigned to investigate the leak of Wilson’s wife on December 30, 2003.115 Fitzgerald was
given “all the authority of the Attorney General” to investigate “the
alleged unauthorized disclosure of a CIA employee’s identity.”116 In the
process of his investigation Fitzgerald subpoenaed reporters who were
involved. In so doing, Fitzgerald had to address the First Amendment’s
freedom of the press provision and the requirement that he only seek
information from reporters on the basis of good faith.117
Good faith in the context of the decision of the Special Counsel to
subpoena reporters to testify before a Grand Jury is different from the
good faith requirement of an executive discussed above. The issue of
good faith arises when reporters are called by a prosecutor to testify
before a Grand Jury, because reporters rely on confidential sources for
stories and if reporters were forced to disclose the identity of their
sources the reporters may not get any sources for fear of public reprisal.
The U.S. Supreme Court held in Branzburg v. Hayes that reporters do
not have a qualified privilege not to testify because of the need for truth
in constitutional proceedings.118 The Special Counsel in this case
argued that even if such a qualified privilege existed, it ought not apply
in this case because the prosecutor is not acting in bad faith, i.e., not
seeking to “harass” the press by subpoenaing reporters.119
In this context, good faith is not a matter of veracity, but intention.
If the standard of good faith is veracity, as I argue, then Bush has not
met the mark by virtue of the indictment, i.e., there is enough evidence
for a reasonable person to conclude the White House was involved in
the leaking of a CIA operative to discredit an Iraq War critic.120 But even
113
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if the standard of good faith is harassment, not veracity, then Bush still
does not meet the mark as Bush brought the issue of authorizing the
use of force in Iraq to Congress during the 2002 election cycle.121 This
parallels the kind of congressional harassment displayed by Johnson in
1964 with the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. What other purpose, other
than political pressure, i.e., harassment, could there have been to seek
war powers during a congressional election? The fact that Bush did not
actually invade Iraq until March 2003 suggests the purpose in October
2002 was akin to Johnson’s purpose in 1964: gain war powers by unnecessarily playing fast and loose with the facts during a congressional
election cycle.
Even more on point, the Bush Administration clearly acted to
“harass” Wilson by outing his wife’s name. If the administration had
simply attempted to debate the merits of the nuclear ambitions of Iraq
with Wilson, that might not have been a breach of the duty of good faith
under the harassment standard; however, the administration brought
the bully pulpit to bear on the family of a political critic. Going after
family members for political purposes is harassment by any reasonable
standard. What else other than harassment could have been intended
by discussing the identity of Wilson’s wife publicly? Whether the standard is veracity, as I prefer, or harassment, President Bush by either
measure violated his oath to “faithfully execute the office of the
President of the United States” by presenting Iraq as an imminent threat
to gain war powers based on discredited intelligence and mishandling
sensitive information for the purposes of political mud-slinging.

SECTION E: THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONSEQUENCE
OF EXECUTIVE DISHONESTY
If one considers the relationship between the executive and the legislature as a kind of marriage, then one can see how a child (a law) produced by deceit becomes illegitimate. In this sexist sense, Johnson and
Bush made Congress a cuckold. A more modern way to say the same
thing is to refer to the maxim that one cannot profit from a wrong.122 It
is proper to view the congressional delegations of war powers as a profit
for Johnson and Bush, respectively, because each received what he had
been asking for before: authorization to start a war. Their profit, however, should be seen as an unconstitutional gain because it came from
a breach of the covenant of good faith. Con artists have as much title to
121
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their swindled goods as Johnson had constitutional authority to start
the Vietnam War and Bush had authority to start the Iraq War. In short:
neither Johnson nor Bush had the constitutional authority to do what
they did. The constitutional oath requires good faith, but Johnson and
Bush acted in bad faith—their breaches, which were material, were about
going to war. As Leo Strauss said, “A decent society will not go to war
except for a just cause.”123

SECTION F: CONCLUSION
That neither Johnson nor Bush had a just cause is taken for granted
from the common perspective. With the benefit of hindsight, the lives
lost in Vietnam and those being lost in Iraq are the product of uncertain ends and dubious beginnings. The only clear benefactor in both
cases is the military-industrial complex that Eisenhower warned
against. Eisenhower’s warning to remain steadfast against the unwarranted intrusion of military authority in the ordinary course of daily life
should not be discounted or forgotten. I have argued here that the cost
of the intrusion, “whether sought or unsought,” has been the presidential oath in Article II of the U.S. Constitution. It is self-evident from this
common perspective that history can only be the basis of progress
when those people in the present are informed enough to steer their
leaders towards proper future ends. To the extent Johnson and Bush
have been permitted to violate their respective constitutional oaths
without constitutional rebuke, Congress and the courts are accomplices
to the violation and will be judged accordingly by posterity.
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